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ARTICLES
SEPARATE PROSECUTIONS FOR
CONTINUOUS CRIMINAL
POSSESSION OF A WEAPON IN NEW
YORK-TWICE IN JEOPARDY?
PEOPLE v. OKAFORE
A major tenet of the American criminal justice system, the
double jeopardy doctrine,' protects an individual from being
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The double or former jeopardy doctrine is encompassed in the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. See id. The amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence [sic] to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; ... ." Id. See generally Thomas, The Prohibition of Successive
Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REv. 323 (1986) (analy-
sis of historical application of double jeopardy doctrine).
The doctrine is also embraced in the New York State Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. I, §
6. It reads in pertinent part that "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense; ...." Id. New York has also enacted a statutory bar to a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1988). It provides in relevant part:
1. A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense.
2. A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same
act or criminal transaction unless:
(a) The offenses as defined have substantially different elements and the acts estab-
lishing one offense are in the main clearly distinguishable from those establishing
the other; or
(b) Each of the offenses as defined contains an element which is not an element of
the other, and the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed to pre-
vent very different kinds of harm or evil; ....
Id.
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placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.' This doctrine,
while affording the accused party an extraordinary remedy,' de-
mands an exacting definition of discrete criminal conduct." A
' See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977). This prohibition dates back to early
common law. Id. at 165. See People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 420
N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979). The double jeopardy rule of law is so essential to a criminal proceed-
ing that the failure to observe it can be raised at any time during the appellate process. Id.
at 7, 394 N.E.2d at 1137, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 374. See also Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75
YALE L.J. 262 (1965) (discusses complexity of double jeopardy rules and exceptions).
3 See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969)). "The Double Jeopardy Clause . . . 'protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.' " Id.
See also Johnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 150, 505 N.E.2d 240, 241, 512 N.Y.S.2d
797, 799 (1987) (N.Y. Court of Appeals reiterating standard).
The United States Supreme Court originally interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to
include a protection against multiple punishment for the same offense. See Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-73 (1873). The Lange Court stated "[t]he argument seems to
us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the constitution was designed as much to prevent
the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence [sic] as from being twice tried
for it." Id. at 173. See also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985) (although de-
fendant could be charged with both receiving and possessing firearm, Congress did not
intend that he be subject to two convictions or sentences for same criminal act); Brown, 432
U.S. at 165 (Double Jeopardy Clause serves as constitutional restraint on courts and prose-
cutors). "This constitutional proscription serves primarily to preserve the finality of judg-
ments in criminal prosecutions and to protect the defendant from prosecutorial overreach-
ing." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 795 (O'Connor, J., concurring), reh'g denied,
473 U.S. 927 (1985). But cf. Note, Double Jeopardy, Due Process and the Breach of Plea Agree-
ments, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 147-48 (1987) (Supreme Court has not set forth test for
consistent application of Double Jeopardy Clause).
An analysis of legislative intent is required to determine whether a defendant can be
punished twice for the same offense. See, e.g., Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779 (Congress intended
the Continuing Criminal Enterprise offense to be separate crime punishable in addition to,
not as substitute for, the predicate offense); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952) (single course of conduct does not constitute more than one
offense under § 15 of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 303-04 (1932) (single sale of morphine creates two distinct offenses under the
Narcotics Act: sale not in or from original stamped package and sale not pursuant to writ-
ten order of person to whom drug is sold); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887) (cohabita-
tion with more than one woman is a continuous crime subject to one prosecution per con-
gressional act); Crepps v. Durden, 2 Cowp. 640, 646 (K.B. 1777) (sale of 4 loaves of bread
in violation of statute prohibiting "worldly labor .. .on the Lord's day" constitutes one
offense).
See N.Y. CRIM. PRoC. LAW § 40.10, commentary at 243-45 (McKinney 1981). "One of the
great substantive advantages of this right is that if one is entitled to it, then the sanction,..
[or] the corrective action is dismissal of the charges and no prosecution." Id. at 244.
See Crepps, 2 CowP. at 646-47. A single persisting criminal enterprise or a continuous
course of criminal conduct mandates a single prosecution. Id.
"The offence [sic] of cohabitation, in the sense of this statute, is committed if there is a
living or dwelling together as husband and wife. It is, inherently, a continuous offence [sic],
having duration; and not an offence [sic] consisting of an isolated act." In re Snow, 120
U.S. 274, 281 (1887). "A distinction is laid down in adjudged cases and in textwriters be-
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court's perception of the nature of a crime, as well as its interpre-
tation of the statutory language prohibiting that crime, is crucial
to the identification of "same offense" within the meaning of the
double jeopardy prohibition.' The definition becomes more com-
tween an offence [sic] continuous in its character ... and a case where the statute is aimed
at an offence [sic] that can be committed uno ictu." Id. at 286. See, e.g., Brown, 432 U.S. at
161. The crimes of joyriding and auto theft, as defined by the Ohio Court of Appeals,
"constitute 'the same statutory offense' within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause." Id. at 168. "The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that
prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into
a series of temporal or spatial units." Id. at 169; United States v. Universal CIT Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952) (corporation, division operation manager and two branch
managers only prosecuted once for course of conduct violating Fair Labor Standards Act);
Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (an agreement to commit multiple
offenses constitutes only one act of conspiracy); Barber v. Plumadore, 86 App. Div. 2d 710,
710, 446 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (3d Dep't 1982) (illegal taking and possessing of wild deer
constitutes single persisting criminal enterprise; prosecution on that charge bars separate
charge for conspiracy); But cf. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 790 ("We have steadfastly refused to
adopt the 'single transaction' view of the Double Jeopardy Clause."); Universal CIT Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. at 226 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Act does not speak of 'course of
conduct.' That is the Court's terminology, not the Act's."); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S.
625, 629 (1915) (one who successively cut and opened six United States mail bags commit-
ted six distinct offenses which are separately punishable).
Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree under N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02(4) is
a continuing offense. See Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at
800. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PIoc. LAW § 40.20, commentary at 247-49 (McKinney 1981)
(discussing New York interpretation of discrete criminal conduct); CALLAGHAN, CRIMINAL
LAW IN NEW YORK § 8:03 (3d ed. 1988) (same).
Separate prosecutions are warranted when distinct offenses have been violated. See Block-
burger, 284 U.S. at 302. Successive sales of forbidden drugs constitute distinct offenses re-
gardless of how closely they follow each other. Id. The distinction is evident "when the
impulse is single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may continue. If
successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a common
stream of action, separate indictments lie." Id. (quoting WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 34
(11 th ed.)); see United States v. Gugino, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1988) (Congress intended
separate prosecutions and punishments for fraudulent uses of counterfeit access devices
and unauthorized access devices; two deemed not mutually exclusive). Cf. Universal CIT
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 224 (Fair Labor Standards Act should be read to "treat[] as one
offense all violations that arise from the singleness of thought, purpose or action which
may be deemed a single 'impulse' "). See generally People v. Erickson, 302 N.Y. 461, 99
N.E.2d 240 (1951) (upholds separate and cumulative sentence on sixty counts of "book-
making"); Thomas, A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishments, 47 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1, 12-25
(1985) (author defines "same" conduct by "unitary conduct test").
I See Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800. In Johnson, the
New York Court of Appeals indicated that if the statute does not define temporal parame-
ters, none should be implied. Id. "Criminal outlawry" should not be derived from an am-
biguous implication. See Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 221-22. "Particularly is this
so when we construe statutes defining conduct which entail stigma and penalties and
prison." Id. at 221.
The double jeopardy doctrine dictates that a question regarding dual punishment for a
single offense should be resolved in favor of leniency. Comment, supra note 2, ati 313-17.
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plex in instances where lesser included offenses are involved."
Additionally, the ordinary rule of strict construction requires that doubts in the construc-
tion of a penal statute be resolved against including borderline conduct. Id. at 317. "Cumu-
lative punishment should be permissible only when the legislature has clearly provided for
it in order to serve some legitimate purpose, not because the ancient urge to punish
smoulders in a judge." Id. at 321. See also Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-86 (analyzes legislative
history and statute to define "same offense"); Thomas, supra note 1, at 337 (concludes that
different concerns inherent in various procedural contexts sometimes require different def-
initions of "same offense").
I See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 1.20 (37) (McKinney 1981). The Criminal Procedure Law
of New York provides in relevant part:
When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly commit-
ting, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is,
with respect to the former, a 'lesser included offense.' In any case in which it is
legally possible to attempt to commit a crime, an attempt to commit such crime con-
stitutes a lesser included offense with respect thereto.
Id. A conviction of a lesser included offense will bar a subsequent prosecution for a higher
degree of the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977). See Johnson, 69
N.Y.2d at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (criminal possession of a weapon in
fourth degree constitutes lesser included offense of criminal possession of weapon in third
degree and is same crime for double jeopardy purposes). Cf. People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d
427, 430, 437 N.E.2d 1146, 1148, 452 N.Y.S.2d 389, 391 (1982) ("A verdict of guilty of
any such offense is not deemed an acquittal of any lesser offense submitted, but is deemed
an acquittal of every greater offense submitted."). See generally Mascolo, Procedural Due
Process and the Lesser-Included Offense Doctrine, 50 ALBANY L. REV. 263, 266-67 (1986) (lesser
included offense doctrine serves as procedural device beneficial to accused by offering the
jury less drastic alternative than choice between conviction and acquittal of offense
charged).
Likewise, a prosecution for a greater offense will prohibit a subsequent action for a lesser
included offense. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 168-69; Ex parte Nielson, 131 U.S. 176, 188-90
(1889); Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, -, 373 N.E.2d 1183, 1188 (1978)
(citing Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150-51, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977)).
See generally CALLAGHAN, supra note 4, § 8:07 (discusses lesser included offenses).
For a criminal defendant to be entitled to a lesser included offense charge, he must make
two showings. People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 63, 439 N.E.2d 376, 377, 453 N.Y.S.2d
660, 661 (1982). The Glover court defined a two-prong test:
First, it must be shown that the additional offense ... is a "lesser included offense,"
i.e., that it is an offense of lesser grade or degree and that in all circumstances, not
only in those presented in the particular case, it is impossible to commit the greater
crime without concomitantly, by the same conduct, committing the lesser offense.
That established, the defendant must then show that there is a reasonable view of
the evidence in the particular case that would support a finding that he committed
the lesser offense but not the greater.
Id. See also People v. Llewelyn, 136 Misc. 2d 525, 529, 518 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1987) (follows Glover test); People v. Cole, 127 Misc. 2d 415, 416, 486
N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985) (same), affid, 131 App. Div. 2d 497, 516
N.Y.S.2d 112 (1987), appeal denied, 71 N.Y.2d 967, 524 N.E.2d 432, 529 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1988); People v. Witherspoon, 120 Misc. 2d 648, 649, 466 N.Y.S.2d, 611, 612 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1983) (same). Cf Green, 56 N.Y.2d at 431, 437 N.E.2d at 1149, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 391 (test not satisfied when "the lesser crime requires demonstration of an
element or fact not required by the greater"). See generally Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned
Approach to the Lesser Included Offense, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 191, 193-94 (1984) (federal
circuit courts of appeals split as to standard for lesser included offense doctrine); Thomas,
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The New York Court of Appeals has struggled with the identifi-
cation of a lesser included offense as it relates to the constitutional
issue of double jeopardy.7 The question is particularly trouble-
some in the context of the state's statutory scheme for criminal
possession of a weapon: 8 Can the continuous possession of a fire-
arm provide the basis for two separate prosecutions?9 If it can,
supra note 1, at 357 (double jeopardy a more difficult issue when initial conviction is for
lesser included offense of crime subsequently charged).
' See Llewelyn, 136 Misc. 2d at 531, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 887. There exist two definitions of a
lesser included offense. Id. The first, a lesser included offense within the double jeopardy
context, is governed by constitutional strictures. Id. The second is defined by the Criminal
Procedure Law. Id. See Johnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 505 N.E.2d 240, 512
N.Y.S.2d 797 (1987). Criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, N.Y. Penal
Law § 265.01, is a lesser included offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02. Further, it "constitutes the same crime for double jeop-
ardy purposes." Id. at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (emphasis added). But
see People v. Rodriguez, 113 App. Div. 2d 337, 343-48, 496 N.Y.S.2d 448, 452-55 (2d
Dep't 1985) (Lazar, J., dissenting) (defendant's conviction for criminal possession of
weapon in the third degree should be reversed because an element of the offense not al-
leged and proved; indictment should be dismissed because defendant had not been charged
with criminal possession of a weapon in fourth degree, a crime not considered a lesser
included offense of crime charged) (emphasis added), rev'd, 68 N.Y. 2d 674, 496 N.E.2d
682, 505 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1986). The N.Y. Court of Appeals reversed "for reasons stated in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Leon D. Lazar at the Appellate Division." Id. See generally
Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (fifth amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative
punishment for greater and lesser included offense); Costarelli, 374 Mass. at -, 373
N.E.2d at 1188 (nature of charged offenses is critical to defining "same" within double
jeopardy context).
8 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01-265.03 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989). The N.Y. Penal
Law provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when: (1)
He possesses any firearm.
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when: (1)
He commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree .
and has been previously convicted of any crime;
(4) He possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession shall not, except as provided in
subdivision one, constitute a violation of this section if such possession takes place in
such person's home or place of business.
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when he
possesses a machine-gun or loaded firearm with intent to use the same unlawfully
against another. ...
Id.
' See Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 242-43, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800. Unlawful
possession of a weapon at different times and places during a six day period is a continuing
offense. Id. Constitutional double jeopardy principles bar a second prosecution. Id. Posses-
sory crimes are defined in terms of "dominion" and "control." Id. at 152, 505 N.E.2d at
243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00[8]). See also People v. Al-
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how does the lesser included jigsaw piece fit into the big puzzle?"0
Recently, in People v. Okafore," the New York Court of Appeals
held that criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
provided the basis for two separate prosecutions where the posses-
sion was uninterrupted and spanned a one-hour period.1" The
court refused to recognize criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree as a lesser included offense of the second degree
modovar, 62 N.Y.2d 126, 130, 464 N.E.2d 463, 465, 476 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1984) (unlawful
use of weapon punishable as separate offense from unlawful possession of weapon). The
illegal conduct defined in the Penal Law is the act of possessing a weapon unlawfully. Id.
(quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01-265.05). The possessory crime is complete once the
unlawful possession of the weapon is established. Id. Cf. Pemberton v. Turner, 124 App.
Div. 2d 338, 340, 508 N.Y.S.2d 294, 296 (3d Dep't 1986) (defendant's retrieval and repos-
session of gun constituted new possessory crime separate from initial offense). See generally
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985) (while a defendant may be prosecuted for
illegal receipt of firearm and illegal possesion of same weapon, he may not suffer two con-
victions or sentences involving "the same criminal act"); United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d
1387, 1390 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 964 (1977) (single prosecution for posses-
sion of firearm on three separate occasions).
"0 See Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (1987). Crimi-
nal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree is a lesser included offense of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree and constitutes the same crime for double jeop-
ardy purposes. Id. Prosecution's claim that the nature of defendant's possession was not
continuous because he may have possessed the weapon in his home or place of business is
rejected. Id. at 152. See People v. Perez, 128 App. Div. 2d 410, 512 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1st
Dep't 1987). "Since it is impossible to possess a loaded firearm without concomitantly pos-
sessing a firearm, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree is clearly a lesser
included offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree." Id. at 411, 512
N.Y.S.2d at 696. But see Rodriguez, 68 N.Y.2d at 674, 496 N.E.2d at 682, 505 N.Y.S.2d at
594; People v. Ali, 36 N.Y.2d 880, 334 N.E.2d 11, 372 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1975); People v.
Llewelyn, 136 Misc. 2d 525, 518 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1987).
Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is a lesser included offense of crimi-
nal possession of a weapon in the second degree. See Pons, 68 N.Y.2d at 265, 501 N.E.2d at
11, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 403; People v. Tejada, 101 App. Div. 2d 757, 475 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st
Dep't 1984); People v. Cole, 127 Misc. 2d 415, 416, 486 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (1985), affd,
131 App. Div. 2d 497, 516 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1987), appeal denied, 71 N.Y.2d 967, 524 N.E.2d
432, 529 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1988); People v. Jackson, 111 App. Div. 2d 648, 490 N.Y.S.2d 211
(1st Dep't 1985). But see People v. McGriff, 123 App. Div. 2d 646, 646, 506 N.Y.S.2d 910,
911 (2d Dep't 1986) (criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is not a lesser
included offense of the second degree crime); People v. Witherspoon, 120 Misc. 2d 648,
466 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983) (same). Criminal possession of a weapon in
the fourth degree is a lesser included offense of the second degree crime. People v. Vac-
caro, 44 N.Y.2d 885, 886, 379 N.E.2d 159, 159-60, 407 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (1978). See
infra note 113 and accompanying text. See generally People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427, 437
N.E.2d 1146, 452 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1982) (lesser included analysis where both offenses in-
volved require culpable mental states).
1 72 N.Y.2d 81, 527 N.E.2d 245, 531 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1988).
12 Id. at 87, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
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crime. 8 Okafore appeared inconsistent with another recent deci-
sion, Johnson v. Morgenthau," where separate prosecutions for the
continuous possession of a firearm over a six day period were
barred as violating constitutional double jeopardy principles." In
Johnson, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree was
found to be a continuing crime. 6 Further, the court deemed
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree a lesser in-
cluded offense of third degree possession." In its attempt to
reconcile these holdings, the Okafore court has demonstrated
ambivalence by retrenching from the Johnson position without de-
finitively establishing a just alternative.1
In Okafore, the defendant, Charles Okafore, shot and killed his
estranged wife in her Bronx apartment." Approximately one
hour later, he was met by the police at his own apartment in
Manhattan, where he had returned to kill himself.20 Okafore al-
legedly drew the same pistol used in the Bronx, now reloaded,
and pointed it at the officers as he ran away.2' He was shot, dis-
13 Id. at 88-89, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
69 N.Y.2d 148, 505 N.E.2d 240, 512 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1987).
Id. at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
16 Id. The Johnson court defined the defendant's possession of the firearm as "an offense
continuous in its character" within the meaning of the Blockburger test. Id.
17 Id.
18 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 89 n.3., 527 N.E.2d at 249 n.3, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766 n.3. See
infra note 106 and accompanying text.
'0 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 83-84, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763. Police arrived
in response to a call but Okafore shot his estranged wife three times before they could stop
him. Id. at 84, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763. The police were summoned to the
Bronx apartment and found Mrs. Okafore's body. See Brief for Appellant at 8, People v.
Okafore, 129 App. Div. 2d 1015, 513 N.Y.S.2d 904 (ist Dep't 1987) (No. 3033/83). Mrs.
Okafore had filed a complaint report against the defendant earlier that same day. Id. at 7.
Okafore believed that his wife was intimately involved with his own son from a former
marriage. See Brief for Appellant at 4, People v. Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d 81, 527 N.E.2d 245,
531 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1988) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. That belief was corroborated
by the fact that his wife had moved in with that son, Christopher Okafore, for a few
months following the marital separation. Id. Additionally, on the day of the homicide,
Okafore discovered birth control pills and a hospital bill for an abortion in his estranged
wife's apartment. Id.
2" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 84, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763. Okafore fled out a
window and down a fire escape at his wife's apartment. Id. He headed to his son's home
intending to shoot him as well. Id. Okafore abandoned that idea before he reached Chris-
topher's home and decided to return to his Manhattan apartment and kill himself. Id.
When he reached his own apartment about an hour after the Bronx incident, police, wait-
ing in the hallway, ordered him to "freeze." Id.
" Brief for Appellant at 3. See Brief for Respondent at 2, People v. Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d
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armed, and arrested by the police.2
Okafore was indicted in Bronx County for murder in the sec-
ond degree, criminal use of a weapon in the second degree and
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. 28 His subse-
quent conviction for manslaughter in the second degree and crim-
inal possession of a weapon in the second degree in connection
with the killing of his wife2 4 was affirmed by the Appellate
Division. 25
During the course of the Bronx County case, Okafore was in-
dicted in New York County for second and third degree criminal
possession of a weapon premised on the threatened use of the pis-
tol against the police in Manhattan.2 Once convicted in the
Bronx, he moved to dismiss the New York County prosecution,
claiming it was barred by the double jeopardy protection of both
the United States Constitution and the New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law, article 40. His motion to dismiss was denied by the
81, 527 N.E.2d 245, 531 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1988). Okafore's gun was established as being the
weapon used to kill his estranged wife. Id. When arrested in Manhattan, it was fully loaded.
Id.
" Brief for Appellant at 3.
" People v. Okafore, 130 Misc. 2d 536, 495 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1985).
" Id. See Brief for Appellant at 5. During his Bronx trial, Okafore testified extensively
about his emotional turmoil due to his belief that his wife and son were intimately in-
volved. Id. at 4. The jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance as well as on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. Id.
The trial court also charged the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second
degree. Id. at 4-5. Okafore was sentenced to two concurrent indeterminate terms of from
five to fifteen years imprisonment. Id. at 5.
25 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 84, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
26 Id.
27 Id. Okafore asserted that the double jeopardy guarantees of the federal constitution
and Article 40 of the Criminal Procedure Law barred the New York County prosecution.
Id. Okafore maintained that "criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was a
continuing, single possessory crime, with the attendant aggravating element of intent to
use ... unlawfully against another." Brief for Appellant at 5-6. He argued that his posses-
sion of the weapon and his unlawful intent concerning the weapon were unbroken during
the one-hour time period between the killing in the Bronx and the arrest in Manhattan. Id.
at 6. Okafore urged the court to recognize that acts of use, or attempted use of the weapon
were not necessary elements of the possessory offense. Id. See People v. Ruzas, 54 App. Div.
2d 1083, 389 N.Y.S.2d 205 (4th Dep't 1976). The Ruzas court adopted the language of the
Supreme Court and maintained that the Criminal Procedure Law does not focus on sepa-
rate examinations of offenses' components. Id. at 1083, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 206. Rather, the
approach requires "looking . . . at the nature of the transaction itself." Id. This standard
enforces the double jeopardy doctrine and additionally "promotes justice, economy and
convenience" by consolidating all issues related to a single transaction into one action. Id.
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court.2" Okafore then pleaded guilty to the second degree weapon
charge in New York County in accordance with the provisions of
a plea agreement. 9 The Appellate Division affirmed the convic-
tion without opinion. 0
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, 1 and
in a four to three decision, affirmed.32 The majority, 3 noting that
second degree possession may encompass a continuous course of
conduct, nonetheless declined to apply the continuous offense
doctrine to the facts of this case." Writing for the court, Judge
Simons conceded that the defendant's possession of the handgun
was uninterrupted throughout the critical one-hour period.35 He
maintained, however, that Okafore's intent constantly changed
during that time.3 6 Judge Simons concluded that a new intent pro-
vided a break in the continuing nature of the crime and created
discrete offenses for which the defendant could be separately
(quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454 (1970)). See also supra note 1 (discusses appli-
cable federal and state law).
Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 84, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763. Although the
prosecution did not oppose Okafore's motion to dismiss, it was summarily denied nine days
after he had been sentenced on the Bronx County charges. See Brief for Appellant at 6.
'9 Brief for Appellant at 6. Okafore was sentenced to a two to six year term to run
consecutively with the prior term of five to fifteen years for the Bronx County conviction.
Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 84, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763. See also infra note 87
(interview with Okafore's attorney).
Because Okafore pleaded guilty to the second degree offense, he was unable to press his
statutory claim under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.20. See People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d
216, 486 N.E.2d 813, 495 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1084 (1986). But cf.
Note, supra note 3, at 143 (plea agreements are "constitutionally sensitive contracts, involv-
ing not only the contractual rights of defendants, but their due process and double jeop-
ardy interests as well.").
People v. Okafore, 129 App. Div. 2d 1015, 513 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1st Dep't 1987).
"l Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 84, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
32 Id. at 90, 527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
33 Id. at 83, 527 N.E.2d at 245, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 762. Judge Simons wrote the majority
opinion, in which Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Hancock and Bellacosa joined. Id.
" Id. at 87, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765. The Okafore court analogized
possession to intent in that it may be durational in nature. Id. However, the majority noted
that second degree possession, unlike third degree, spans only the period during which the
defendant possesses the weapon and harbors the unlawful intent to use it against another.
Id. "If either element lapses, the crime is complete. A discrete crime is committed when
the defendant, having retained possession of the weapon, later forms a new criminal in-
tent." Id. See also supra note 4 (crimes defined as either continuous courses of conduct or
discrete offenses).
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 87, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
" Id.
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prosecuted.8
The court rejected application of its recent holding in Johnson
to the present case.3 8 It narrowed Johnson by limiting its relevance
to cases that only involved criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree.3 The Okafore court stressed the specific intent ele-
ment of second degree criminal possession that is absent from the
third degree crime." Insisting that Okafore had multiple intents
and various intended victims, the court refused to recognize that
he was continually committing a possessory offense. 4 The neces-
37 Id. at 88, 527 N.E.2d at 248-49, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66. The intent to commit sui-
cide does not support a second prosecution because the statute requires an intent to use the
weapon against another. Id. The majority interpreted Okafore's suicide intent as terminat-
ing the former intent (killing his wife and son) and reasoned that his initial impulse had
ceased. Id. The court concluded that Okafore manifested a new intent to use his weapon
when he was confronted by the police in Manhattan. Id.
" Id. at 87, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765. See also infra notes 56-61 (Okafore
court construes specific intent as temporal parameter) and 101-06 (Okafore court rejects
criminal possession of weapon in third degree as lesser included offense of second degree
crime) and accompanying text.
9 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 88-89, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766-67.
40 Id. The court maintained that the legislature intended for the second degree criminal
possession of a weapon offense to be analyzed by its specific intent element. Id. at 89, 527
N.E.2d at 249-50, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766-67. To define the criminal conduct of the defend-
ant, the Okafore court applied Blockburger. Id. at 86-87, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at
765. It concluded that two separate impulses corresponded to two different intents, and
that discrete offenses necessarily occurred. Id. at 87-88, 527 N.E.2d at 248-49, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 765. See supra notes 4 (separate prosecutions warranted for discrete offenses)
and 37 (defendant's suicidal thoughts break continuous nature of his impulse and intent).
4 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 87-88, 527 N.E.2d at 248-49, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66. During
the course of oral arguments in Okafore, the court of appeals expressed its concern about
the interpretation of § 265.03 as it pertained to multiple intended victims. People v.
Okafore (NY-SCAN television broadcast # 121 of N.Y. State Ct. of Appeals oral argument,
April 20, 1988) (transcript on file at N.Y. Ct. of Appeals Law Library).
Judge Bellacosa: . . . the one discrete fact . . . that you have not identified to my
satisfaction as yet is that you've got separate victims as the potential targets with
respect to the wrong that's classified with different culpable mental states in this case
as opposed to Johnson, do you not?
Mr. Kartagener [attorney for defendant]: ... The intent to use unlawfully, just like
the intent of reckless endangerment . . . is a state of mind, that doesn't require, I
submit, a particular identifiable victim....
Judge Bellacosa: There is a break in the continuity here in two respects: not only the
different culpable mental state, but the object of that culpable mental state, isn't that
so?
Mr. Kartagener: Well, your honor, there may well be. But if I could suggest that in
Pons the court was dealing with a situation where the defendant was acquitted based
on a justification defense of the actual use of the weapon against the victim . . .
[A]nd the court said that he still was not entitled to [the defense for] . .. the crime
of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, because even if he was
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sity to bar prosecution on constitutional double jeopardy grounds
was not acknowledged."3
Judge Kaye, writing for the dissent, 43 noted that the majority
ignored the premise of Johnson." The dissent argued that as long
as possession of a weapon continued uninterrupted, it was one
possessory offense subject to a single prosecution.4" The dissent
further noted that the gist of the entire comprehensive statutory
scheme for possession, including second degree criminal posses-
sion of a weapon, centered on unlawful dominion and control."6
Acknowledging that this possessory crime is aggravated because of
justified with respect to that individual victim, during the continuum of time .... in
which he possessed the weapon, it could have been with the intent to use it unlaw-
fully against a different other...
Id. (emphasis in original)
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 83, 89, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 249-50, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763, 767.
"The 'essence' of [the offense] is not possession but the intent to use the weapon against
another and the offense should not be equated to simple possessory offenses for double
jeopardy purposes to 'bridge' episodes of second degree possession into a single offense."
Id. at 89, 527 N.E.2d at 249-50, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767. But see id. at 94, 527 N.E.2d at 252,
531 N.Y.S.2d at 769. "Thus, based on the statute, our own recent precedents and funda-
mental precepts of the criminal law, we would reverse defendant's conviction on grounds
of double jeopardy." Id.
The bar to re-prosecution "[e]nsures that the State does not make repeated attempts to
convict an individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and ex-
pense, while increasing the risk of erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sen-
tence." Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1224 (1986).
See Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984). Additionally, the double
jeopardy doctrine prevents a defendant "from being subjected to multiple punishments for
the same offense." Id. at 307. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). A primary purpose of
the Double Jeopardy Clause is the preservation of the finality of judgments. Id. at 33. In
this regard, the clause is "akin" to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id.
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 90, 527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767. (Kaye, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Kaye wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Titone and Alexander. Id.
" Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 91, 93-94, 527 N.E.2d at 251-52, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that application of both Braverman and Blockburger supported a single
prosecution for the continuous possession of a weapon. Id. at 93, 527 N.E.2d at 252, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 769. See supra note 4 (continuous course of conduct mandates single
prosecution).
"0 kafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 90-92, 527 N.E.2d at 250-51, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting). See People v. Confoy, 138 Misc. 2d 1049, 526 N.Y.S.2d 352 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Bronx County 1988). In Confoy, the defendant was charged with driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol in Bronx County as well as criminally negligent homicide in New York
County, where he was involved in a hit and run accident. Id. at 1050-51, 526 N.Y.S.2d at
352-53. The court rejected his claim that his conviction for the homicide barred prosecu-
tion for the vehicular charges. Id. at 1054-55, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 355. In distinguishing
Brown v. Ohio and Johnson v. Morgenthau, the Confoy court insisted that possessory crimes
were legislatively defined in terms of dominion and control. Id. Hence, the time span in-
volved became irrelevant because the possession is a continuous criminal act. Id.
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol..4: 97, 1988
the specific intent element, the dissent stressed that its essence re-
mains possessory.4 While recognizing that the crime may become
more serious, and be punished accordingly, Judge Kaye indicated
that multiple prosecutions for the continuous possessions were im-
permissible.48 The dissent addressed a concern expressed by the
People that a defendant who has possessed a weapon with a cer-
tain unlawful intent may not be allowed to threaten others. 9
Judge Kaye noted that any use, attempted use or threatened use
of the handgun supported separate prosecutions and punishments
and that these were chargeable along with criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree.50 The dissent maintained that the
defendant's possession of a weapon with the intent to use it unlaw-
fully against a number of people was a single, continuous course
of conduct. 51 It concluded that this rationale was consistent with
the basic premise of American criminal law that no crime can be
committed by evil intent alone.52
It is submitted that the Okafore court incorrectly focused on the
specific intent element of the crime charged and minimized the
importance of the crime's possessory nature. It is suggested that
the Okafore "object of intent" analysis disregarded a major pre-
47 Okafore, at 91, 527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68 (Kaye, J., dissenting). See
People v. Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d 126, 130, 464 N.E.2d 463, 465, 476 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97
(1984). "The essence of the illegal conduct defined in sections 265.01-265.05 of the Penal
Law is the act of possessing a weapon unlawfully." Id. (emphasis added).
48 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 91, 527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68 (Kaye, J., dis-
senting); see supra note 9 (criminal possession of weapon is continuing crime subject to
single prosecution; use may be separately prosecuted).
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 94-95, 527 N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Kaye, J., dis-
senting). The dissent addressed the issue of the defendant not being given a "free ride."
Id. at 95, 527 N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770. See infra note 87 and accompanying text
(Okafore's attorney observed court's concern on this issue).
50 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 95, 527 N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
" Id. at 93-94, 527 N.E.2d at 252, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (Kaye, J., dissenting). See supra
note 4 (continuous course of conduct mandates single prosecution). But see supra note 41
and accompanying text (majority concern about multiple intended victims).
52 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 94, 527 N.E.2d at 252, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (Kaye, J., dissent-
ing). An act or omission is required before criminal liability may attach. Id. An evil intent
"cannot transform what would otherwise constitute a single crime into multiple criminal
offenses." Id. See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2(b) (2d ed. 1986). Evil intent,
standing alone, while possibly an aggravating factor of an offense, does not support a crimi-
nal conviction. Id. at 196. In his oral argument, Mr. Kartagener drew a distinction between
"discrete acts" and "discrete thoughts." People v. Okafore, NY-SCAN television broad-
cast, supra note 41.
People v. Okafore
mise of American criminal jurisprudence by attaching liability for
the evil thoughts of a defendant. Additionally, it is suggested that
the court wrongly rejected consideration of a lesser included of-
fense. Finally, it is submitted that the constitutional guarantee of
the double jeopardy doctrine did not prevail.
I. THE Okafore RULE: CONSTRUING A TEMPORAL PARAMETER
A. Intent as an Aggravating Element
The Okafore court has construed the aggravating element of sec-
ond degree criminal possession of a weapon, intent to use unlaw-
fully against another, as a temporal parameter of the offense.53
Although the statutory language and the legislative history of the
offense are non-specific regarding such a parameter, 4 the court
has imposed a construction which rejects the rule of lenity." Al-
though the Okafore court maintained that the Johnson holding was
peculiar to the third degree offense," both second and third de-
gree criminal possession represent portions of the same statutory
scheme.57
The Johnson court was critical of reading a temporal or spatial
parameter into a statute." In Okafore, the majority has done pre-
"' Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 89, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766-67. See id. at 90,
527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
" See supra note 8. The relevant statute, N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03 does not set forth a
temporal parameter; rather, it is the Okafore court that construes one. See supra note 53.
Section 265.03, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, was a part of the
1974 recodification of former section 265.05. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03, commentary at
475 (McKinney 1988). The new offense was defined as a felony, conviction of which man-
dated the imposition of an indeterminate sentence. Id. "Its purpose, as part of the Gover-
nor's legislative program, was to discourage criminal possession and use of handguns." Id.
See N.Y. Gov. MEMO. Nos. 128, 129 (1974), reprinted in [1974] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 424 "In
providing stiffer penalties for those convicted of illegally possessing handguns .... these
bills will help to reduce the availability and illegal use of handguns in this State." Id.
" See Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 90, 527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (Kaye, J., dis-
senting); supra note 5. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 313 (rule of lenity, devel-
oped by United States Supreme Court for use in single statute context, states that doubts
should be resolved against creation of multiple units of conviction).
56 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 83, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
Id. at 90-91, 527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Kaye, J., dissenting). See People
v. Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d 126, 130, 464 N.E.2d 463, 465, 476 N.Y.S.2d, 95, 97 (1985);
supra note 8.
" Johnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 152, 505 N.E.2d 240, 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d
797, 800 (1987). The Court of Appeals, in Johnson, noted that the legislature is free to
define criminal conduct in temporal units. Id. The court pointed out, however, that al-
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cisely that, asserting that multiple unlawful intents divide that
which would otherwise be a continuing offense into a series of dis-
crete crimes.59 The Okafore court maintained that the legislature
sought to prohibit more than simple possession when it enacted
Penal Law section 265.03.60 The court further suggested that, un-
like third and fourth degree possession, the "essence" of the sec-
ond degree offense was not possession, but rather intent."'
The Okafore court's reference to People v. Almodovar62 sought to
.substantiate the court's contention by stressing that a crime may
be made more serious when it involves an element of intent.6 3
Yet, the court of appeals in Almodovar pointedly stated that the
essence of the illegal conduct defined in sections 265.01 through
265.05 of the Penal Law is the act of possession." The Almodovar
court stressed that any unlawful use was punishable as a separate
crime.65
B. The Object of Intent
The Okafore construction of criminal possession of a weapon in
the second degree includes an additional dimension.66 The de-
fendant's identification of an intended victim constitutes the for-
mulation of a discrete intent.67 Under the Okafore view, every time
though there are instances where the legislature has done so, such is not the case with
respect to possessory crimes. Id. The court concluded that it was not the legislative intent
to define the charged offense, third degree criminal possession of a weapon, temporally
and refused to construe the statute accordingly. Id.
59 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 87-88, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765; see supra note
34.
0 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 89, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
I id.
62 N.Y.2d 126, 464 N.E.2d 463, 476 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1985).
63 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 89, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d at 130, 464 N.E.2d at 464, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 96 (emphasis
added).
" Id. (emphasis added). See People v. Pons, 68 N.Y.2d 264, 266, 501 N.E.2d 11, 12, 508
N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (1986).
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 87, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765. See infra notes 67-
68 and accompanying text.
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 87-88, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765; see supra note
41 and accompanying text. The Okafore court demonstrated this interpretation of the N.Y.
Penal Law § 265.03 throughout the course of oral arguments. See People v. Okafore (NY-
SCAN television broadcast # 121 of N.Y. State Court of Appeals Oral Argument, April 20,
1988).
Chief Judge Wachtler: Let's parce it out, though, with respect to how the proof has
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a defendant who possesses a weapon contemplates a different in-
tended victim, he is subject to a new prosecution for the second
degree possessory crime. 8 This interpretation is neither evi-
denced by the legislative history of the statute, 9 nor is it consis-
tent with the statutory presumption of possession."0 The presump-
tion allows the fact finder to infer that the defendant intended to
use the weapon unlawfully against another.7 The identity of an
intended victim within the presumption is irrelevant.7 ' The lan-
to come in. Is there not a requirement in connection with this [second] degree of
possession that the People prove an intent with respect to a particular object?
Mr. Kartagener: Absolutely not, Your Honor. Not a particular individual. I would
suggest to Your Honor that the crime of possession with intent to use unlawfully . .
.- there can be circumstances that will be indicative of an individual's willingness to
use a gun unlawfully, without the People being able to prove that it was going to be
used unlawfully against a particular individual....
Id.
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 87-88, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765. "[Okafore's]
possession of the handgun was uninterrupted, but his intent constantly changed during that
one-hour period. Initially he intended to kill his wife and after doing so, he left to shoot his
son. He subsequently abandoned that plan and returned to his apartment with the inten-
tion of taking his own life." Id. The Okafore court demonstrated its conviction on this issue
by referring to a single continuous intent as a hypothetical contention. Id. at 88, 527
N.E.2d at 248-49, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66. "[E]ven if it be contended that defendant had
but one intention, to use the gun against his wife, his son and anyone who tried to stop
him ...... Id. The court implicitly rejected this contention. Id. It is submitted the Okafore
court's statement that a defendant would only commit one offense if his intent was directed
to "one or more of a group of people" is not supported by its analysis. Id. at 89-90, 527
N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
" See supra note 54 and accompanying text (legislative history of second degree criminal
possession of weapon does not indicate intent to construe temporal parameter).
70 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4) (McKinney 1980). The presumption of possession for
unlawful intent provides in relevant part: "The possession by any person of any dagger,
dirk, stiletto, dangerous knife or any other weapon, instrument, appliance or substance
designed, made or adapted for use primarily as a weapon, is presumptive evidence of intent
to use the same unlawfully against another." Id.
" See People v. Taylor, 121 App. Div. 2d 581, 582, 503 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (2d Dep't
1986), appeal denied, 68 N.Y.2d 817, 499 N.E.2d 885 (1986); People v. Evans, 106 App.
Div. 2d 527, 532, 483 N.Y.S.2d 339, 345 (2d Dep't 1984); People v. Hassan, 57 App. Div.
2d 594, 595, 393 N.Y.S.2d 606, 606 (2d Dep't 1977). A jury can properly infer intent
from the circumstances surrounding the criminal conduct. See Taylor, 121 App. Div. 2d at
582, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 634; Evans, 106 App. Div. 2d at 532, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 345; Hassan,
57 App. Div. 2d at 595, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
There are cases where the legal presumption is unnecessary and the circumstances of the
possession necessitate the conclusion of imputability. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability,
93 YALE L.J. 609, 652 (1984); see CALLAGHAN, supra note 4, § 43:03. The validity of the
legal presumptions for possession is tested by a reasonableness standard. Id. There must be
a rational link between the facts proved and the inferences presumed. Id.
" Robinson, supra note 71, at 652. A statutory presumption imputes a culpable mental
state or a certain objective element of an offense in instances where additional facts indi-
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guage of the presumption does not stipulate that "another" be
specifically articulated. Even absent the presumption, if such an
identity is known it is not construed as a temporal parameter that
divides a continuous course of conduct into discrete crimes."4
The Okafore construction is capable of rendering grossly inequi-
table results.75 In a prosecution for criminal possession of a wea-
pon in the second degree, there is no burden on the People to
prove that the defendant identified one or more specific victims.76
In a case where there is insufficient evidence regarding the de-
fendant's intent, the fact finder may deem the statutory presump-
tion of possession applicable and thereby infer defendant's unlaw-
ful intent against "an unknown other. '77 Thus, absent proof of
one or more specific intended victims, the defendant would be
subject to a single prosecution. 78 Alternatively, where there is
cate that these criteria are in fact satisfied. Id. Such a legal presumption facilitates ease and
efficiency of prosecution without risking the conviction of innocent parties. Id. "Many pos-
session offenses represent codified presumptions that where there is possession, there also
probably exists the harm or evil that the possession offenses actually seek to prevent and
punish." Id. at 653. See generally Robinson, supra note 71, at 656-57 (discussion of balanc-
ing interests with presumptions). "Society must frequently choose between ineffective pros-
ecution of dangerous offenders and unacceptably intrusive investigative methods or eviden-
tiary advantages for prosecutors." Id. at 656. This balance may be best achieved by a
flexible approach where the significance and exigency of effective prosecution is weighed
on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 656-57. For instance, in a case of food adulteration, "it may be
better to tolerate more intrusive investigative procedures rather than to tolerate more er-
roneous convictions." Id.
7" See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4) (McKinney 1980); supra note 70 (provides relevant
part of presumption of possession for unlawful intent).
"' See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942). The Supreme Court rejected
an analysis that equated the number of prosecutions with the quantity of criminal objects.
Id. "The rule of lenity further presumes that a statute proscribes the transaction itself and
cannot be subdivided further into the number of victims injured by the conduct." Thomas,
supra note 4, at 15. The case law appears to create a presumption that "a criminal statute
proscribes a course of conduct, rather than the discrete physical acts making up the course
of conduct or the number of victims injured by the conduct." Id. at 21. See also Okafore, 72
N.Y.2d at 93-94, 527 N.E.2d at 252, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (application
of Braverman supports single prosecution).
75 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 94, 527 N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Kaye, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent expressed concern that the new rule was unworkable. Id.
"e See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03 (McKinney 1980). The specific identity of a victim is not
an essential element of the offense. Id.
" See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4) (McKinney 1980); Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 94, 527
N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
71 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4) (McKinney 1980). Because the legal presumption in-
fers intent against "a singular other," there is no basis for multiple prosecutions. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.03 (McKinney 1980).
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proof that the defendant formulated intent toward specific vic-
tims, the Okafore analysis requires separate prosecutions of second
degree criminal possession for each evil thought against "a differ-
ent other." ' These two cases reveal a single common act: the pos-
session of a firearm.80 The only distinction is the state of each de-
fendant's mind with respect to his intended victims."' Although
each defendant committed the same act, the two situations would
lead to dramatically different results. 2 Assuming conviction in
each case, one defendant would be subject to a single sentence
while the other would accrue multiple punishments.8 It is even
possible that the latter defendant could receive a cumulative sen-
tence that would exceed the sentence given to an individual con-
victed of murder.8 4
The American criminal justice system requires the minimum of
a voluntary act on the part of the accused for criminal liability to
attach.88 The Okafore construction conflicts with this basic premise
'9 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 90, 527 N.E.2d at 250, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 767. "But if the origi-
nal unlawful intent is abandoned and subsequently a new intent is formed to use the
weapon against others during the period of possession, more than one crime is commit-
ted." Id. Contra id. at 93-94, 527 N.E.2d at 252, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 769-70 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
so Id. at 94, 527 N.E.2d at 252, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 769-70 (Kaye, J., dissenting). The New
York Penal Code indicates the necessity of an "act" in the articulation of crimes. Id. A
culpable mental state affects the degree of punishment, but is not a valid substitute for the
requisite "act." Id.
"1 Id. The dissent criticizes a rule that requires the probing of defendant's mind to deter-
mine his specific intent and intended objects. Id.
s SeeJohnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 505 N.E.2d 240, 242, 512 N.Y.S.2d
797, 799 (1987); see also United States v.Jones, 533 F.2d 1387, 1390 (6th Cir. 1976) (court
cites examples demonstrating irrationality of excessive results) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 964
(1977). But cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932) (if penalty pre-
scribed is too harsh, it must be remedied by congressional act, not "by judicial legislation
under the guise of construction").
83 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 94, 527 N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Kaye, J., dissent-
ing). "Theoretically, continued possession in a crowd now can support dozens of separate
prosecutions; a defendant apprehended with a weapon after verbally expressing an intent
to use it against a series of persons, without ever using it at all, could be subject to multiple
prosecutions for second degree possession." Id.
81 Id. at 94, 527 N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Kaye, J., dissenting). The legisla-
ture, in enacting § 265.15[4] of the Penal Law, did not intend to allow punishment for an
uninterrupted possession to be more severe than that imposed for a homicide. Id.
8" See People v. Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d 126, 464 N.E.2d 463, 476 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1984).
Without the prescribed act or course of conduct, there is no crime. Id. at 130, 464 N.E.2d
at 465, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
A basic premise of American law is that a crime cannot be committed by evil intent
alone. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 52, at 196. "Something in the way of an act, or
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in that the possibility of multiple prosecutions, convictions and
sentences will exist solely because of the state of the defendant's
mind.86
It is submitted that the Okafore court blurred its interpretation
of the second degree offense with considerations of intent, use
and victim. Circumstances surrounding the Manhattan incident
may have factored into the court's decision."7 It is further submit-
ted that this unworkable construction creates an inconsistency in
the law which violates the double jeopardy doctrine.
. II. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES IN THE POSSESSORY SCHEME
Because the prosecution for a lesser included offense bars the
of an omission to act where there is a legal duty to act is required too." Id. A wish to
commit an illegal act does not constitute a criminal offense so long as the intent does not
generate an actual crime. Id. See also Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime, 39 DIcK. L.
REV. 95 (1934) (discusses requirement of act in order for criminal liability to attach); supra
notes 52 & 80 (requiring a complete act to attach criminal liability).
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 94, 527 N.E.2d at 253, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Kaye, J., dissent-
ing). "Evil intent-while possibly an aggravating factor or even a prerequisite to criminal
liability-cannot, standing alone, support a criminal conviction, and it cannot transform
what would otherwise constitute a single crime into multiple criminal offenses." Id. See W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 52, at 196. "A statute purporting to make it criminal sim-
ply to think bad thoughts would, in the United States, be held unconstitutional." Id. See
also supra note 80 and accompanying text ("act" is what dictates a crime, culpable mental
state only affects degree of punishment).
87 Interview with Steven R. Kartagener, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, in New
York City (Aug. 25, 1988). Mr. Kartagener noted that it was possible that the outcome in
Okafore may have been determined in large part by the "flavor" of the case rather than on
the court's technical analysis of the statutory scheme for criminal possession of a weapon.
Id. He indicated that the Court of Appeals, during the course of oral arguments appeared
quite concerned that the defendant could get a "free ride," that is, a barred prosecution
for an incident with police in Manhattan because of another distinct incident in the Bronx
where defendant killed his wife. Id. If Okafore was not convicted of the second degree
offense in Manhattan County, it was feared that he might be getting a "bite of the apple."
Id.
Additionally, Mr. Kartagener suggested that the emotionally charged nature of "an at-
tack on police" was the likely reason for the vigorous Manhattan prosecution of Okafore, a
prosecution that demanded consecutive sentencing with the prior Bronx convictions. Id.
He noted that such a demand is somewhat unusual in this context; more typically, the
sentences are concurrent. Id.
"The mere act of producing a weapon when police confronted [Okafore] is a step away
from attempted murder." Id. In Mr. Kartagener's opinion, charges for attempted murder,
attempted assault and reckless endangerment would not have succeeded given the facts of
the Manhattan incident. Id. Menacing proved to be an unacceptable alternative to the pros-
ecution because of its misdemeanor status. Id. Hence, the only felony with which Okafore
could be charged was criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Id.
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subsequent prosecution for a greater offense,88 the lesser included
designation runs to the core of the constitutional double jeopardy
issue. 89 Once a mere procedural device, the lesser included of-
fense doctrine has evolved into "a basic component of the due
process right to a fair trial."9 If a jury believes a defendant is
guilty of an uncharged offense it may find him guilty of the
charged offense because of an unwillingness to allow him to "go
free." 91 Alternatively, society benefits from the doctrine in cases
where the prosecution would otherwise fail because an element of
the only crime charged was not proved.9 2 Absent the lesser in-
" See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (joyriding held to be a lesser in-
cluded offense of auto theft so conviction of former precludes subsequent conviction of
latter). Accord Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978). See supra note 6 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of greater and lesser offenses). See also Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (established rule determining whether acts of defendant consti-
tute two separate offenses or a single offense with one act being lesser offense of other).
8 Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501 (1984) (Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prose-
cution of greater offense when already convicted of lesser offense); see Brown, 432 U.S. at
168. "[W]here ... a person has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various
incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time tried for one of these incidents without
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Id. (quoting Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S.
176, 188 (1889)); Johnson v. Morganthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 150, 505 N.E.2d 240, 241, 512
N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (1987). "[D]ouble jeopardy clauses of the state and federal Constitu-
tions protect an accused against a second prosecution for the same offense . . . and against
multiple punishments for the same offense." Id.
" Mascolo, supra note 6, at 264. Initially, the lesser included offense doctrine was estab-
lished to implement the policy against more than one trial for the same allegations. Id. at
265. "Subsequently, the doctrine was employed at common law to assist the prosecution in
those cases which the evidence failed to satisfy some element of the offense charged." Id. at
265-66. See Ettinger, supra note 6, at 192. The doctrine is particularly valuable because of
the "inaccurate nature of pretrial predictions regarding such factors as the precise content
of testimony or the persuasive effect of any evidence." Id.
0' Mascolo, supra note 6, at 266-67. The lesser included offense doctrine provides a jury
a less drastic alternative to the all-or-nothing choice between conviction of the charged
offense and acquittal. Id. "In any event, we must not forget that justice cuts both ways. If it
is just to acquit an innocent man, it is also just to convict the guilty." Id. at 299. See People
v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427, 433, 437 N.E.2d 1146, 1149, 452 N.Y.S.2d 389, 392 (1982). See
also Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Pennsylvania: Uncertainty in the Courts,
84 DicK. L. REv. 125, 125-26 (1979) (lesser included offense doctrine evolved to benefit
defendant by giving jury alternative to conviction of greater offense); supra note 87 and
accompanying text (interview with attorney for appellant in Okafore discussing Court of
Appeals' concern with defendant getting "free ride").
92 Compare Green, 56 N.Y.2d at 433, 437 N.E.2d at 1149, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (lesser
included offense doctrine benefits society where prosecution would otherwise fail because
element of crime charged was not made out) with People v. Tejada, 101 App. Div. 2d 757,
475 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dep't 1984) (conviction for criminal possession of weapon in second
degree reduced to criminal possession of weapon in third degree due to insufficient evi-
dence). "In this case the interest ofjustice will be better served by a conviction of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree." Tejada, 101 App. Div. 2d at 757 (emphasis
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cluded offense doctrine, there may be cases where the stringencies
of the criminal standard of proof and the defendant's right to be
presumed innocent" are disregarded. 94 It is suggested that
Okafore represents a case where a correlative constitutional right
of the defendant has been thusly compromised. It is further sug-
gested that an analysis of lesser included offenses, independent of
the continuing crime issue, reveals this compromise.
In Okafore, the lesser included offense doctrine dictated that
once the defendant was convicted of second degree possession in
the Bronx proceeding, he was necessarily convicted of every lesser
included offense as well.9" When Okafore left Bronx County, re-
turning home to kill himself, he was no longer guilty of criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree; his intent was not
"to use unlawfully against another."9 Rather, for that brief pe-
riod, he was guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree.91  When Okafore subsequently encountered police, he
regained the intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another,
added).
93 See N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAW § 300.10 (McKinney 1988). This section, which contains the
"court's charges; in general," provides in relevant part:
(1) At the conclusion of the summations, the court must deliver a charge to the jury.
(2) In its charge, the court must state the fundamental legal principles applicable to
criminal cases in general. Such principles include, but are not limited to, the pre-
sumption of the defendant's innocence, the requirement that guilt be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt....
Id.
4 Mascolo, supra note 6, at 267. "Without the alternative of convicting the accused of a
lesser-included offense, the jury may in some cases disregard the stringencies of the reason-
able doubt standard of proof and the defendant's right to be presumed innocent." Id. See
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634-35 (1979) (failure to provide jury with "third option"
of conviction on a lesser included offense will threaten defendant's benefit of reasonable
doubt standard).
" See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977); Ex parte Nielson, 131 U.S. 176,
188-89 (1889); Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, - , 373 N.E.2d 1183, 1188
(1978) (quoting Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1977)); see generally CALLA-
GHAN, supra note 4, § 8:07 (discusses lesser included and related offenses).
" See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03 (McKinney 1980) (emphasis added). See supra note 37.
The intent to commit suicide does not satisfy the specific intent element of criminal posses-
sion of a weapon in the second degree because an intent to use the weapon against another
is required. See also Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 88, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765
("[i]ntent to commit suicide cannot support a prosecution for second degree criminal pos-
session of a weapon").
' See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989). Okafore possessed a
loaded firearm throughout the relevant time. Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 84, 527 N.E.2d at 246,
531 N.Y.S.2d at 763. His possession occurred neither in his home nor place of business. Id.
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the aggravating element of second degree possession.98 At that
point, his crime was elevated back to the second degree level. 99
Hence, Okafore's unlawful possession of the handgun throughout
the Bronx and Manhattan episodes included an interval when his
offense lapsed from second degree to third degree possession."'
In Johnson, the New York Court of Appeals deemed criminal
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree to be a lesser in-
cluded offense of the third degree crime when the defendant's
possession "lapsed down." ' The defendant's six-day possession
of a weapon included periods when he took the weapon home.0 2
The People argued that two prosecutions were warranted:103 one
for third degree criminal possession, an offense which excludes
weapon possession in the defendant's home, and the other for
fourth degree criminal possession, an offense encompassing those
periods in the home.'" Rejecting the prosecution's claim, the
Johnson court noted that "[b]oth statutes reflected the legislative
goal to criminalize that [possessory] conduct although in different
degrees depending on where it occurred."10 5
The Okafore court rejected criminal possession of a weapon in
the third degree as a lesser included offense of the second degree
crime notwithstanding Johnson.'" Irrespective of the Okafore
" Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 88, 527 N.E.2d at 248-49, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.03 (McKinney 1980).
o Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 88, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766. "When later con-
fronted by the police in Manhattan, however, defendant became chargeable with another
count of second degree criminal possession because while possessing the gun he manifested
the newly formed intent to use it against them." Id. See Johnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d
148, 505 N.E.2d 240, 512 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1987). The Johnson court acknowledged that the
defendant's criminal possession of a weapon may have "lapsed down" from third to fourth
degree if he had taken the gun home during the six-day period. Id. at 152, 505 N.E.2d at
242, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
100 See Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 88, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766. The majority
stated that the interval of time in which Okafore intended to kill himself could not support
a prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Id. The court went
on to note that the encounter with police in Manhattan made defendant chargeable with
another count of second degree criminal possession. Id. See supra note 37.
01 Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d at 152, 505 N.E.2d at 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (1987).
102 Id.
100 Id.
104 See supra note 8 (relevant parts of comprehensive statutory scheme).
1 Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 88, 527 N.E.2d at 249, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766 (emphasis added).
The New York Court of Appeals in Okafore discussed its recent decision in Johnson as it
related to lesser included offenses. Id.
106 Id. at 89 n.3, 527 N.E.2d at 249 n.3, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766 n.3.
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court's position on third degree possession, the issue of the fourth
degree crime's status as a lesser included offense remained."°7
"Naked possession," the fourth degree offense, 0 is a single con-
tinuing crime for double jeopardy purposes entitled to lesser in-
cluded offense status.'0" Its only element, to possess a firearm,"' is
necessarily a part of all the greater degree offenses for criminal
possession of a weapon."' Therefore, Okafore implicitly commit-
ted fourth degree criminal possession of a weapon throughout the
Bronx and Manhattan incidents, while he was additionally com-
mitting either second or third degree criminal possession depend-
We indicated in Johnson that the fourth degree offense was a lesser included crime of
the third degree offense. Our point was simply that the two crimes should be
deemed the same for double jeopardy purposes. We did not mean to suggest that
fourth degree possession of a weapon constituted a lesser included offense of the
third degree crime within the narrow definition of lesser included offenses set forth
in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20(37). With respect to this appeal it should be noted
that third degree possession of a weapon is not a lesser included of the second de-
gree offense.
Id. But see id. at 92, 527 N.E.2d at 251, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Kaye, J., dissenting). The
dissent was critical of the majority's "departure from, and inconsistency with, our own re-
cent precedents .... " Id.
107 Id. at 89, 527 N.E.2d at 249-50, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 766-67. Although the Okafore court
never specifically addressed the issue of fourth degree possession as a lesser included of-
fense of the second degree offense, it alluded to it. Id. "[Second degree criminal possession
of a weapon] should not be equated to simple possessory offenses for double jeopardy pur-
poses to 'bridge' episodes of second degree possession into a single offense." Id. See Brief
for Appellant at 25. On appeal, Okafore argued that even if the court concluded that
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was not a continuing crime, the Man-
hattan prosecution was barred on double jeopardy grounds because both second degree
counts were linked by the lesser included offenses of criminal possession of a weapon in the
third and fourth degree. Id. Okafore maintained that fourth degree criminal possession of
a weapon was a "necessary building block" of the greater offense. Id. at 28.
10' See CALLAGHAN, supra note 4, § 43:19, at 37.
101 Johnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 152, 505 N.E.2d 240, 243, 512 N.Y.S.2d
797, 800 (1987). See People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 439 N.E.2d 376, 453 N.Y.S.2d 660
(1982); People v. Perez, 128 App. Div. 2d 410, 512 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1st Dep't 1987). The
Perez court, concluding that criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree was a
lesser included offense of third degree possession, reasoned that it was "impossible to pos-
sess a loaded firearm without concomitantly possessing a firearm .... " Perez, 128 App.
Div. 2d at 411, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 696. But see Okafore, 72 N.Y. 2d at 89 n.3, 527 N.E. 2d at
249 N.3, 531 N.Y.S. 2d at 766 n.3. The Okafore court, with reference to Johnson, main-
tained that fourth degree possession of a weapon did not constitute a lesser included of-
fense of the third degree crime. Id. Rather, "[tihe two crimes should be deemed the same
for double jeopardy purposes." Id. See also People v. Vaccaro, 44 N.Y.2d 885, 886, 379
N.E.2d 159, 159-60, 407 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (1978) (fourth degree criminal possession of a
weapon is lesser included offense of second degree crime). See generally supra note 6 (basic
lesser included offense discussion).
110 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989).
.. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.02-265.03 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989).
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ing upon the specific interval of time.112 Hence, the lesser
included offense doctrine dictated that defendant's Bronx prose-
cution and conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree encompassed a conviction for the continuing, lesser
included offense, fourth degree possession.-' The Manhattan
prosecution for second degree possession, a higher degree of the
same offense, should have been barred by the double jeopardy
doctrine."'
CONCLUSION
The constitutional protection afforded by the double jeopardy
doctrine is an indisputably essential premise of the American
criminal justice system. In Okafore, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has unwittingly failed to recognize the doctrine's applicabil-
ity. Its denial of the continuous nature of criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree represents a setback when viewed in
light of the court's recent decisions. The Okafore construction de-
prives some defendants of the minimum required voluntary act
necessary for a criminal prosecution in attaching multiple liabili-
ties for a single continuous possession. Moreover, by rejecting the
il' See Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 87, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765. Okafore's
possession of the handgun was uninterrupted. Id. Therefore, he necessarily possessed a
firearm when he concomitantly possessed a loaded firearm. Id. (emphasis added). See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989). Additionally, Okafore necessarily
possessed a firearm when he concomitantly possessed a loaded firearm with intent to use it
unlawfully against another. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03 (McKinney 1980) (emphasis added).
18 See Vaccaro, 44 N.Y.2d at 886, 379 N.E.2d at 160, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 632. Fourth de-
gree criminal possession of a weapon is a lesser included offense of the second degree
crime. Id. The Vaccaro court held that the overlapping of elements in the second and
fourth degree offenses did not render the statutes unconstitutional. Id. See also supra note
95 and accompanying text (lesser included offense doctrine dictated that once defendant
was convicted of a crime, he was necessarily convicted of every lesser included offense as
well).
114 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977); accord Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501
(1984); see Johnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 152, 505 N.E.2d 240, 243, 512
N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1987).
"Given that the defendant is entitled to put before the jury every meritorious defense, it
seems anomolous to proscribe the introduction of an ameliorative legal theory by denying
the defendant of a right to a lesser included offense charge." Ettinger, supra note 6, at
216. The lesser included offense standard and the law of double jeopardy are "inextricably
bound to each other": once a defendant has been prosecuted for either the lesser or
greater offense he cannot subsequently be charged with the other crime. Id. at 219.
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lesser included offense status of the third and fourth degree
crimes, the court has created an anomaly in the law. The Okafore
decision forces an "all or nothing" choice where a necessary alter-
native exists.
Patricia A. LaFroscia
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